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There are twenty insert plates of valuable illustrations, but no maps—though some are much needed for the colonial chapters—and no index.

FRANK MALOY ANDERSON.

Naval Operations. By Sir JULIAN S. CORBETT. Volume II. [History of the Great War based on Official Documents, by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence.] (New York and London: Longmans, Green, and Company. 1921. Pp. xi, 448. 21s.)

THE first volume of this truly monumental naval history of the late war was reviewed in the *American Historical Review* of October, 1920 (XXVI. 94-96). It contained 470 pages, and ended with the account of the battle of the Falklands. The present volume is approximately of the same length, though of much greater bulk, owing to the very excellent strategical and other maps, of which no fewer than fifteen are folding. The book covers the raid on the Yorkshire coast of December, 1914, the Dogger Bank action, and the destruction of the *Dresden*, but the greater portion is taken up with the Dardanelles campaign. When the British government announced the preparation and appearance of an *Official History of the Great War*, there was much curiosity in regard to the character of such a work, published so soon after the events to be described and, presumably, to be criticized. Without allowing sufficient lapse of time for the necessary "historical perspective", was it not somewhat audacious to attempt more than the United States naval authorities were doing, namely, the collection and collation of the records and the publication of certain limited monographs?

It must be admitted that Sir Julian Corbett has solved this more than difficult problem in an astonishingly successful manner. While indulging in no high-handed apportioning of praise and blame, he presents the facts, be they favorable or damning, clearly and fully, so that the results stand out for themselves. At the same time he is ever jealous of reputations, and strives to present what was no doubt in the mind of a leader who failed of his purpose, as, for example, his apology for Admiral Cradock after Coronel. Very significant also is his invariable defense of men who have been blamed unjustly, like Mr. W. S. Churchill in the Coronel affair and that of the Dardanelles, and Lord Fisher in regard to the Dardanelles. Concerning the latter he says: "The loss at such a crisis (resignation from the Admiralty) of a man who bulked so large in popular opinion could only add to the general depression. To the country at large he was the embodiment of the old fighting energy of the navy—the man to whom we owed the organization and strategical disposition which rendered the German fleet impotent when the long-expected struggle began, and the all-embracing combination against Admiral von Spee which had given us our only decisive success at sea" (p. 410). Fisher's resignation started the débâcle of the cabinet, and "within five days of

Fisher's departure the leaders of the great parties in the State were sitting in council to form a Coalition Government". That Lord Fisher was in no manner responsible for the Dardanelles disaster is clearly brought out: "When Lord Fisher first supported the idea of perfecting the unity of the allied line by opening the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, he contemplated making the attempt with a strong combined force which was to strike suddenly and quickly. . . . It was only with reluctance that he had assented to the Dardanelles enterprise as it was actually undertaken, and so soon as it became clear that the political situation in the Balkans and the available military force gave no prospect of success by a *coup de main* he became frankly opposed to it." When his colleagues refused him the necessary forces to strike a quick blow he resigned.

In spite, however, of the manner in which Sir Julian has overcome the difficulty of writing history so soon after the events, the idea will not down that it would have been wiser to postpone the publication of the official history for a certain period, an idea to which the author himself gives color in his remarks upon certain authorities: "The publication of these works since the history began to be written has proved of great assistance in correcting false impressions and supplying gaps in our own information." It would be a hardy prophet indeed who should declare that no further important documents would come to light, and that no more useful, even vital and indispensable, books would appear. Any claim of finality must, therefore, be denied to any history written before all the actors in the drama have spoken and all the records have been filed. The present really marvellous work of Corbett, Fayle, and Hurd must, however, be admired and welcomed, for it may be doubted whether, at a future time, any authors could command that enthusiasm of style that raises even the description of commonplace occurrences out of the commonplace, and makes them throb with interest, that enthusiasm that flows from men still under the influence of the stupendous events they are narrating.

EDWARD BRECK.

Battlefields of the World War, Western and Southern Fronts: a Study in Military Geography. By DOUGLAS WILSON JOHNSON, Professor of Physiography in Columbia University. [American Geographical Society Research Series, no. 3.] (New York: Oxford University Press. 1921. Pp. xxvi, 648, and plates. \$7.90.)

ALL military operations culminate on the battlefield; the final test of a manœuvre is the battle which terminates it, its striking features are the skirmishes incidental to it. The soldier must study these engagements, for his is the responsibility of handling troops in battle. The civilian thinks largely in terms of battles, for the actual conflict is the visible evidence of the manœuvre behind it.

But behind it is the manœuvre, the strategy, of which the tactics are